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In this paper we argue for the recognition that anti-doping is in itself first and foremost an 
ethical position. The current World Anti-doping Code formulation of ‘the spirit of sport’ is an 
acknowledgement of this point and a rejection of scientific and technicist understandings of 
the nature of anti-doping itself. We critically review the Code formulations on ‘the spirit of 
sport’. Based on a theoretical background of various approaches to normative agreement and 
consensus in a setting of diversity of ‘comprehensive views’ (Rawls 1987), we argue for 
revision of the Code. Specifically, we argue for a re-formulation of ‘the spirit of sport’ in 
terms of athlete protection and the preservation of the integrity of sporting competition that 
could meet requirements on an overlapping consensus among all WADA stakeholders. This 
is not just a matter of formality and Code acceptance. An overlapping consensus is not a mere 
modus vivendi but a normative consensus based on fair, honest, and transparent discourse in 
which participants deliberate in a setting of mutual respect and trust, and of ‘decency’ 












Within the philosophy of sport, the justification of anti-doping practices has traditionally 
been based on arguments employing the concepts of ‘health’ and ‘fairness’ (Loland and 
McNamee 2015). The position of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), enshrined in its 
principal policy document the World Anti-doping Code (‘the Code’), builds on similar 
concerns but refers to a more general, normative ideal. In all versions since its inception, 
WADA makes general ethical remarks at the beginning of its Code relating to the 
preservation of ‘the spirit of sport’. 1 In support of the main thrust of the Code – the 
identification of substances and methods that it prohibits – the Code presents three criteria to 
support potential inclusion on its Prohibited List (PL) of which violation of ‘the spirit of 
sport’ is one. These criteria have been the core of academic contention. While some scholars 
have argued for the need for explicit normative premises such as ‘the spirit of sport’ (Loland 
and McNamee 2016), others have argued for its abolition due to its inoperability (Kayser et al 
2007, Kornbeck 2013).  
 
In this essay, we (i) present a critical review of the current WADC ‘spirit of sport’ criterion; 
(ii) examine more general, ethical perspectives on the possibilities of a global ‘overlapping 
consensus’ on normative criteria in anti-doping; and (iii) propose a revised formulation of 
‘the spirit of sport’ in terms of athlete protection and the preservation of the integrity of 
sporting competition. This revised version, we argue, could meet requirements of an 
overlapping consensus among all WADA stakeholders while enabling operational utility in 
concrete cases.  
 
‘The spirit of sport’ of the Code: a critical review 
 
In the Code, doping is defined as ‘the occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule 
violations (ADRVs) set forth in Article 2.1 through Article 2.10 of the Code.’ These articles 
list operative definitions of doping such as ‘the presence of prohibited substances in athletes’ 
samples’, ‘the use of prohibited substances and methods’, and ‘attempts on evading, refusing 
                                                 
1 https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-code.pdf, p. 14. 
Accessed December 7, 2017. For an overview of the historical background of ‘the spirit of sport’-criterion, see 
Ritchie (2015). 
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or failing to submit doping samples’.2 Despite the fact that the general public equate doping 
with the first and second listed ADRVs (‘presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites 
or markers in an athlete’s sample; use or attempted use by an athlete of a prohibited 
substance or a prohibited method’) WADA does not specify any hierarchy within their Code.  
We may conclude, then, that there is no doping-jurisprudential reason why these ADRVs 
should be privileged. Nevertheless, it is the substances or methods themselves that are the 
focus of most disputes, alongside a particular jurisprudential mechanism, ‘strict liability’, 
meaning that athletes are ascribed full and unconditional responsibility for the outcome of 
doping tests independent on actual negligence or intent to harm (Connolly 2003, Soek 2006, 
McNamee and Tarasti 2010). Though reasons regarding exculpation may be considered upon 
appeal, they are consequent to the issuing of an ADRV, following an adverse analytical 
finding (AAF) and its verification in a second sample test.  
 
These substances and methods are selected based on three more general criteria of which 
prohibited means and methods must meet at least two:  
 
1. Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the 
substance or method, alone or in combination with other substances or methods, has 
the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; 
2. Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the use 
of the substance or method represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete;  
3. WADA’s determination that the use of the substance or method violates the spirit of 
sport described in the introduction to the Code.3 
 
It is worth noting that, although they require conceptual and/or ethical judgments of extent 
(i.e. of performance enhancement or health risk), the first two criteria are perceived as 
                                                 
2 The full list runs: presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete’s sample; use 
or attempted use by an athlete of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method, evading, refusing or failing to 
submit to sample collection; whereabouts failures; tampering or attempted tampering with any part of doping 
control; possession of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method; trafficking or attempted trafficking in any 
prohibited substance or prohibited method; administration or attempted administration to any athlete in-
competition of any prohibited substance or prohibited method; or administration or attempted administration to 
any athlete out-of-competition of any prohibited substance or any prohibited method that is prohibited out-of-
competition; complicity; and prohibited Association. See https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-code.pdf, pp. 18-24. Accessed 
December 7, 2017.  
3 See https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-code.pdf, p. 
30. Accessed December 7, 2017. 
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matters of facts underpinned, to a greater or lesser extent, by relevant biomedical research 
(McNamee 2012, 2015; Loland and Hoppeler 2012, Loland 2018). The third criterion is 
unquestionably a normative one and based on a view of the value and meaning of sport, of 
what sport ought to be at its best. It reads: 
 
Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This 
intrinsic value is often referred to as ‘the spirit of sport.’ It is the essence of Olympism, 
the pursuit of human excellence through the dedicated perfection of each person’s 
natural talents. it is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human 
spirit, body and mind, and is reflected in values we find in and through sport, including:  
 
• Ethics, fair play and honesty  
• Health 
• Excellence in performance  
• Character and education  
• Fun and joy 
• Teamwork 
• Dedication and commitment 
• Respect for rules and laws 
• Respect for self and other Participants 
• Courage 
• Community and solidarity  
 
Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.4  
 
Articulating this normative rationale in the WADC has been significant and pioneering work 
attempting to characterise anti-doping as an ethical position. Referring to ‘the spirit of sport’ 
implies acknowledging that anti-doping is not just a technical or scientific matter but an 
expression of a view of the value of sport. Still, much scholarship and professional discussion 
has centred on this criterion pointing to its falling well short of an adequate conceptual 
                                                 
4 https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-code.pdf, p. 14. 
Accessed December 7, 2017. 
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analysis or even a prescriptive definition.5  Scholars and anti-doping personnel argued during 
the last WADA Code Review process (2011-13) that the first two criteria on performance-
enhancement and health were sufficient to draw lines between permissible and prohibited 
substances and methods and determine the PL, and that the latter normative criterion was 
vague and with little operative force and could be deleted (Kayser et al 2007, Kornbeck 
2013). For the first two rounds of the review process this had been recommended, but in the 
final round the normative criterion was kept. 
 
The critique of the ‘spirit of sport’ criterion is relevant to a certain extent, notably when it 
comes to vagueness and lack of clear operationalization. On the other hand, McNamee (2012; 
2015) has argued that, on logical grounds, conceptual vagueness is intrinsic to all natural 
languages and does not necessarily prevent agreements in judgement regarding interpretation 
and application of concepts to particular cases a general philosophical argument. Classic 
examples in the literature include colour predicates; when, precisely does orange become 
red?; and Sorites type paradoxes; precisely how many grains of sand are required to form a 
heap? (Sorenson 2001).  With respect to sport examples one might observe that although the 
rule 12 in football (soccer) prohibit pushing with excessive force, we are nevertheless likely 
to find much agreement about borderline cases: how much vigour constitutes excess? 
(Football Association, 2018).  Equally, the Union Cycliste International (UCI) stipulates in 
their constitutive rule 2.3.036 on sprints that “Riders shall be strictly forbidden to deviate 
from the lane they selected when launching into the sprint and, in so doing, endangering 
others.” (INRNG, 2010). But just how much of a deviation is required to trigger the rule? 
With specific reference to anti-doping regulations, one may consider 4.1b of the International 
Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUE) where it states that to obtain a TUE inter 
alia : “The Therapeutic Use of the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method is highly 
unlikely to produce any additional enhancement of performance beyond what might be 
reasonably anticipated by a return to the Athlete’s normal state of health immediately prior to 
treatment, following the treatment of the acute or chronic medical condition.”6 The list of 
vague terms here is not insignificant: “highly”; “normal”, “immediate”. At each point one can 
                                                 
5 See its critics, for example, Foddy & Savulescu (2007), Savulescu, Foddy & Clayton (2004), Levine (2006), 
and Kayser et al (2007), and Dimeo and Moller, (2017). 
5 For an overview of the debate, see Loland (2018); Loland & Hoppeler (2012), McNamee (2012), McNamee 
(2014), and our positioning within it (Loland and McNamee (2016).   
 
6 https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/therapeutic-use-exemption-tue/international-standard-for-
therapeutic-use-exemptions-istue. Accessed September 24, 2018. 
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reasonably ask what degree of (eg) height, normality, immediacy, and so on will be our cut 
off point?  And so it is with the other two concepts that make up the criteria for the PL : 
“performance enhancement” (how much how, long lasting, etc) and “health” (which of the 
many conceptions should be utilised?). Since the PL expert group does not publish its 
minutes we cannot know precisely how these were operationalised, but some examples may 
illustrate the challenge.  
 
Imagine having only the criteria of performance-enhancement and health. Suppose that there 
was clear evidence that a particular method or substance was performance-enhancing, and if 
there was also clear evidence of potential harm to health, substances and methods should be 
considered for the PL. But this is too crude. Heavy and sustained training is performance-
enhancing and may present a clear risk of harm to athletes’ health in terms of a variety of 
specific and non-specific conditions and syndromes. Sports such as bobsleigh, boxing, or 
downhill skiing can lead to serious injury and even death: they are inherently risky 
endeavours. In other words, the idea that one may resolve problems regarding the 
interpretation of these criteria by a positivistic reliance on medical or scientifically based 
criteria is fundamentally flawed.  
 
The simple examples above illustrate clearly that the very notion of anti-doping policy and 
practice represents an inherently normative stance. Put simply, anti-doping is an value-based 
position on how sports ought to be pursued – whether in training or competition. The 
challenge then is not the existence of a normative criterion in the definition of doping, but 
how clearly this criterion could be articulated and operationalised more explicitly while at the 
same time constituting a basis for consensus among all stakeholders in global anti-doping 
work.  
 
The idea of an (overlapping) consensus: moral minimalism and thin commitments 
 
Those committed to the ethical mission of the World Anti-Doping Code, rather than mere 
subjects of it, should seek to find agreement for the strictures and policies that comprise it 
and WADA’s related International Standards (eg for Education, Therapeutic Exemption 
Certificate processes). The achievement of a modus vivendi, a ‘mere’ agreement, represented 
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by the contingent or unprincipled alignment of interests does not necessarily provide an 
ethical justification.7 
 
The challenge presented to global sports administrators and policy makers is a new and 
significant one with complex political and moral philosophical roots. In many ways, modern 
ethical theory addresses the challenge of finding common, normative principles in complex 
multicultural societies with citizens of diverse attitudes, beliefs and values. The philosophical 
antecedents to this challenge are set in modernity. Early moral philosophical attempts to 
precisely capture the uniquely demanding rules of conduct were highly ambitious; scholars 
looked to construct overarching theories that attempted to prescribe impartial universal norms 
such as in the architectonic theories of Kant and Mill. Political philosophers in more recent 
times have been, to a greater or lesser degree, more modest in their philosophical ambition. 
Their self-reflective critical awareness has often driven them to more circumspect accounts of 
morality, conscious of the theoretical divide between liberal and communitarian worldviews 
(Mulhall and Swift 1996).   
 
The general problem in moral and political philosophy of articulating reasonable pluralism is 
of course magnified in the development of any global policy, such as the possibility of human 
rights discourses amid the clash of liberal and communitarian political cultures (Kymlicka 
1991). The form that this consensus might take is contested. We briefly sketch four 
conceptions in the political philosophy of Habermas, Rawls, Walzer, and Taylor, before 
turning our sights on how their scholarship might better help in revising the normative 
justification of anti-doping as found in the Code. These conceptions could also shape debates 
better as WADA attempts to move into a more consensual mode for their legitimation in the 
global drive for ethical sport.  
 
Jurgen Habermas has been at the forefront of the development of what is referred to as 
‘discourse ethics’ in which moral issues are discussed in open and rational ways in a quest for 
common agreement. Among the scholars we briefly survey, his ambitions are more 
ambitious, if not so much in content then certainly in their procedural requirements. 
Habermas seeks to articulate the conditions for social coordination in societies where there is 
                                                 
7 One might query whether the current dispute and (dis-)agreements over the eligibility of Russian athletes 
and the Russian Anti-Doping Agency are precisely expressions of such a modus vivendi. 
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no unitary metaphysical view of the world that each member of that society accepts. He sets 
out normative principles to which individuals with different metaphysical views of the world 
can assent.  
 
The Habermasian view of an ideal communicative situation has developed over the decades 
of his scholarship and has had impact in direct and indirect ways in the discourses on public 
institutions and policies (White 1995). A legitimate normative discourse has to take place 
based on certain procedures in which there is a mutual recognition and respect between 
participants who are motivated to accept the better argument, in which no relevant arguments 
are excluded, and in which there are no asymmetrical power structures (Habermas 1995). 
Disputants are committed to following the arguments where they lead. It has a clear 
democratizing agenda, attempting to reconcile modernity with classically developed 
universalistically-driven conceptions of morality and rationality. It is for these reasons his 
mature stance has been labelled ‘post-metaphysical’. For Habermas, public opinion may steer 
but ought not determine normative conclusions in the public sphere. Importantly, he calls for 
much closer dialogue between philosophers and social scientists. In our present context, 
ideally, all stakeholders (for example, athletes, leaders, sport organizations, public 
authorities, fans and informed supporters) would be obliged to engage in an open, honest and 
rational discourse on relevant rules and regulations determining conduct in anti-doping 
matters, in relationships neither saturated nor driven by considerations of power.  
 
A significant body of secondary scholarship has emerged in relation to various aspects of 
Habermas’ work, but notably there is criticism of his ideal-perspective. Ideal communicative 
situations are not realizable in practice. Critics argue that we must recognise in political 
deliberation that functional discourses ought to take into account the impact of different 
power structures and interests to a significant extent (White 1995). Habermas’ mature writing 
appeared to withdraw from idealised speech demands, to recognise the particular appeal of 
life history and tradition, though, at root, his universalist defence of human dignity showed 
his idealistic commitments. On these grounds, though Habermas’s position appears apt to 
describe the more democratising processes of WADA’s reforms such as opening up to 
increased input from stakeholders, it is not clear that anything remotely like a decision-
procedure emerges in a form suitable for complex international policy spheres such as anti-
doping.   
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The explicit idea of an overlapping consensus arises in the writing of the of the leading 
political philosopher John Rawls.  Withdrawing from his early metaphysical claims about the 
ordering of any just (i.e. fair) society, Rawls’ later work became more explicitly anchored in, 
and explicitly advocating, the political traditions of liberalism (Rawls 1987; 1993; 1999). 
One philosophical construction that emerged became a source of hope for achieving 
agreement in conditions of deep conflict across the political divide. In complex societies with 
individuals and groups holding a variety of diverse and, to a certain extent, contrasting 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ (i.e. substantive or ‘thick’ political, religious and cultural visions), 
agreements can be reached on just rules and regulations and a common basis for interaction. 
The goal of such efforts would be to achieve an ‘overlapping consensus’. In political 
processes and public debate with stakeholders who justify their arguments with appeal to 
public values and standards, laws can be established that can cohere with a variety of 
comprehensive doctrines. One example can be laws that protect and promote the right to 
religious freedom that can be accommodated within both religious and secular perspectives. 
To Rawls, an overlapping consensus is the stable and lasting route to establish and preserve 
unity and stability given the fact of reasonable pluralism in democratic societies (Rawls 
1993).     
 
Communitarian thinkers such as Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer have, in their own way, 
aimed at a similar goal of consensus but have attempted to avoid what appeared to be a 
hidden liberalising of that concord.8 Walzer attempted to articulate something like this 
position in relation to justice from a communitarian standpoint (Walzer 1987; 1994). He 
argued that there was no ‘moral Esperanto’ (indeed that Esperanto was always closer to 
European languages than others anyway), and that what he labelled ‘moral minimalism’ was 
                                                 
8 We record the fact that we do not discuss the work of Alasdair MacIntyre here, and this might seem to the 
reader to be something of a lacuna. Some words of justification are therefore required. MacIntyre (1981), much 
celebrated in the philosophy and ethics of sports, had argued against the malaises of modernity and for a return 
to the ethics of virtue, cultivated in social practices that were tradition bound and formed part of the narrative of 
one’s life. Both he and Taylor argued for the necessity of shared ideas, values and ends for the stability of 
society and the pursuit of the good life. Critically, this for MacIntyrean followers of sports has means the 
cultivation of certain human excellences or ‘internal goods’ (Brown, 1992; MacIntyre, 1981; McNamee, 1995). 
‘Internal goods’ can only be achieved when one has committed oneself to the norms of practices and the 
authoritative voices of them. In specific social practices such as sport, there is the possibility of more or less 
tacit commitments to standards of excellence in spite of participants holding diverse and to a certain extent even 
contradictory ‘comprehensive doctrines’. Sporting games are played in meaningful ways involving players from 
all over the world. Hence there might be a potential in anti-doping in a MacIntyrean approach when it comes to 
articulating views on the integrity of sport. A normative consensus on global anti-doping policy however 
involves more general norms and values and requires probably procedures along the Rawlsian and Waltzerian 
lines sketched above.   
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always to be drawn from among our values and commitments, not somehow standing above 
or apart from them.  
 
Walzer contrasts his view with the idea that there is no neutral starting point for moral and 
political theorizing, and draws support from Hampshire (1989: 72) who defends the search 
for a ‘thin notion of minimal procedural justice … the conditions of mere decency’. 
Likewise, minimalism for Walzer is ‘less the product of persuasion than of the mutual 
recognition among the protagonists of different fully developed moral cultures’ (Walzer 
1994: 17). He puts the point more forcefully against liberals:  
 
Cultural pluralism is a maximalist idea, the product of a thickly developed liberal 
politics. Minimalism depends on something less: most simply, perhaps, on the fact 
that we have moral expectations about the behaviour not only of our fellows but of 
strangers too. (Walzer 1994: 17)  
 
He speaks of the process not as some ethereal rational deduction but of a ‘ramshackle affair’ 
(Walzer 1994: 18), acknowledging the messiness of genuine, not idealized, political and 
moral discourse.  Whether this is enough to get ‘decent’ debate off the ground in terms of 
women’s rights, labour rights, aboriginal rights, family law, or for that matter, anti-doping, is 
a source of ongoing conjecture and dispute.   
 
We have said that what all principled positions should seek to avoid is a mere modus vivendi; 
a temporal or contingent alliance that might be arbitrary or lacking robustness or coherence. 
Habermas, Rawls, Taylor and Walzer all emphasize the possibility of consensus on particular 
schemes of conduct and interaction in diverse societies. An open and ‘decent’ discourse on 
norms and values can provide the ground for binding relationships characterized by mutual 
recognition of rights and duties. In our present context, it is reasonable to believe that 
compliance will be enhanced where parties have come to agreements on minimal 
commitments.  Set against this background, what are the possibilities for global consensus on 
the normative justification of anti-doping? 
 
Overlapping consensus and the World Anti-doping Code review process  
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We turn our attention now to the formal processes of the 2020 Code reform. In an era where 
WADA has tried to secure greater compliance, in the wake of the Russian doping saga, the 
current status quo shows little resemblance with unconstrained discourse aiming at 
overlapping consensus as it looks more like a strained stand-off.9 Presenting a detailed 
argument, Dimeo and Møller (2018) point to that the anti-doping campaign as a whole is in a 
crisis and needs critical rethinking to avoid collapse. Walzer’s conception of minimalism 
makes a point of some power: pluralism and unconstrained communicative discourse is the 
outgrowth of a particular historical political culture. It is too thick: that is to say, it is 
inseparably connected to a liberal doctrine or perspective. We are left wondering whether 
attempts to achieve a genuinely overlapping consensus, rather than paring thickness back to 
thinness, are doomed to failure? 10 
 
To answer this question, it is important first to query whether our present concern is with 
quite such deep matters as, for instance, universal franchise and the commitments of various 
United Nations universal declarations. We are, after all, talking about sport, a family of rule- 
bound practices, where conformity to the rules is a precondition of participation.11 Of course, 
visible identification with (as opposed to commitment to) universal notions of dignity, respect 
and so on are instantiated in ideals such as Olympism, or policies such as those of the 
international and European soccer federations’ (FIFA and UEFA) wearing of badges on 
sports clothing and stadia marketing. By contrast, more substantive ethical and political 
obstacles to consensus exist in areas such as excluding women from certain sports based on 
‘gendered’ considerations alone (Andersen and Loland 2016); the wearing of ‘immodest’ 
female sports clothing that might offend certain religious positions (Benn et al 2010, Benn et 
al 2011, Morgan 1998); or the International Association of Athletic Federation’s (IAAF) 
insistence on compulsory hormonal (testosterone) depletion of female athletes who are 
                                                 
9 Though as we write, it appears, amid controversy and dispute, that an apparent modus vivendi enabling 
Russian participation in international sporting events is imminent.  
10 The terms ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ are widely used in moral and political philosophy. Although it is not an 
unambiguous dichotomy, philosophers’ distinctions between thin and thick moral concepts (Williams, 1985).  
Thin ones such as ‘dignity’, ‘justice’, ‘respect’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and so on are thin. Who, after all wants to 
deny agents their dignity or justice or treat them without respect. Their content is minimal to the point that they 
can command widespread assent. Other concepts of evaluation have greater local content. Notions such as 
‘brutality’, ‘complicity’, ‘courage’, ‘disgust’, ‘modesty’, ‘treachery’ are thicker and more determinate but, as 
Williams notes, they are all concepts of a certain moral specificity, that are ‘determined by what the world is 
like’ (1985:129).   
11 Whether the anti-doping rules are logically constitutive of the sport is not a matter of agreement in the sport 
philosophical literature. It has been claimed that anti-doping rules are better thought of as auxiliary rules (Meier, 
1985).  
 12 
diagnosed with hyperandrogenism (Karkasis et al 2012, Franklin et al 2018, Camporesi and 
McNamee 2018, Schultz 2012). We maintain that, in general, anti-doping does not face these 
levels of difficulties; almost every nation on the planet has signed the UNESCO charter for 
clean sport.12 And, such is the power of international federations and the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Paralympic Committee (IPC), almost every 
country in the world has signed up to the WADA Code.  
 
Do international treaties and conventions amount to an overlapping consensus? Or are they 
more like a coercive offer: sign up or you will be denied access to international markets, trade 
agreements, state funds, marketing and sponsorship opportunities and so on? Certainly, any 
sport or state that rejected WADAs global framework tout court would be viewed, in sporting 
terms, as a pariah state. And Russia, rightly or wrongly was afforded this status despite 
ongoing challenges between the Court of Arbitration for sport, the IOC and the IPC.  
 
To a certain extent, answers can be found by looking into WADA’s call for stakeholder 
viewpoints in their Code revision processes. Where before WADA had simply determined 
policy without recourse to stakeholders, in the 2012-14 Code review and revision they 
engaged for the first time in comprehensive stakeholder dialogue. WADA President, Craig 
Reedie, during the early part of his tenure remarked that “I wanted WADA to be both 
collaborative and impactful. If we are collaborative, we can work closely with all ADOs to 
meet the challenges we face, and do so through a culture of openness and transparency.” 
(Reedie 2015).  Equally, its then General Secretary, David Howman, wrote: “The greatest 
benefit derived from all these events was that WADA was able to hear the areas of concern, 
and challenges faced from all stakeholders. WADA has listened and responded to these 
concerns.” (Howman 2015) 
 
Undeniably, WADA reached out to all doping stakeholders from government signatories to 
the Code, to International Federations, National Anti-Doping Organizations, and the 
academic community to receive their views.  In their 3rd Code review process since 2009, 
WADA claims it is seeking to strengthen anti-doping policy by increased stakeholder 
engagement in more democratic vein, having instituted (and now repeating) a two-year, three 
                                                 
12 See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/international-convention-
against-doping-in-sport/ Accessed June 4, 2018. 
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phase, process, originally undertaken in the 2014 Code review. Whether such an official call 
reaches to all stakeholders is a point that has been challenged. In their study of how 
individual and team athletes cope with and relate to their own use of banned substances, 
Boardley et al (2015) talk of mechanisms of ‘moral disengagement’. Others go further to 
claim that the anti-doping movement is some conspiratorial alliance between WADA, law 
enforcement authorities, event organisers, and global media (Dimeo and Møller, 2014). Anti-
doping organisations (including International Federations) might respond that they all have 
athlete commissions though the extent to which these are the product of participatory 
democracy might be questioned. Moreover, there may be practice-communities, like 
bodybuilding, with other norms to doping usage that may be unlikely to engage in these 
formal processes (Boardley et al, 2015). Still, what is clear is the existence of such entities 
along with the global and well-advertised call for contributions from all quarters to join the 
discussion of Code reform. Whether that is sufficient is a moot point. 
 
A further point must also be noted. The demands of an open and democratic normative 
discourse entail a level of accountability that in turn rests on transparency. One difficulty in 
the previous 2012-14 process was the failure of WADA to publish how stakeholder 
contributions were discussed, accepted, rejected, modified and so on. Insofar as an 
overlapping consensus is the goal, transparency of reasoning, and agreement as to the 
processes of the PL operation and its contents is required. At the moment, it is limited to 
consultation followed by authoritative conclusions reified into the Code.  
 
On a pragmatic point, therefore, we believe that WADA should not only highlight changes to 
the Code, but also make clear where such revisions came from, and why they were accepted. 
And, of course, WADA should elsewhere make clear where revisions were not accepted and 
why. These simple revisions of process would make progress in the direction of an 
overlapping consensus for the Code review process in general.  
But what about the specific ethical content enshrined in the very justification of anti-doping 
itself? Can references to ‘the spirit of sport’ serve as a basis for an overlapping consensus 
among all stakeholders in the anti-doping domain? 
 
As emphasized above, reaching consensus on operational definitions of doping in terms of 
particular substances and methods based on considerations of performance-enhancing effect 
and potential harm, is, at least to a certain extent, matters of scientific research, facts or at 
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least our best approximations of truth claims. Certainly, explicitly normative premises are 
‘thicker’ and have less prospect for an overlapping consensus as they are linked to social, 
cultural and moral values.  If normative premises of anti-doping are closely associated to 
substantive values and visions, or specific norms and values, such as those of amateurism and 
or Olympism, the possibility for consensus is reduced. Even though the list of values has 
been included in all previous versions of WADA’s Code, it represents a particular, ‘thick’, 
ideal, view of sport. Is it possible to ‘thin’ them down (somehow) to reconcile competing 
views of anti-doping policy generally and the spirit of sport specifically and thus provide a 
base for an overlapping consensus among WADA stakeholders? 
 
‘The Spirit of Sport’ – a revised version  
 
The Preamble to the current Code opens with the following sentences: ‘Anti-doping 
programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is 
often referred to as ‘the spirit of sport.’ It is the essence of Olympism, the pursuit of human 
excellence through the dedicated perfection of each person’s natural talents, it is how we play 
true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and is reflected 
in values we find in and through sport…’.   
 
The notion of intrinsic and instrumental values in sport has spawned a considerable literature 
(Coalter 2007, Giulianotti and Walsh 2002, McNamee 1994, McNamee 1995, Parry 
Martinkova 2013).  It represents a general problem in axiology and moral philosophy. Elite 
sports, which the WADA code governs, are inextricably linked to what have been called 
‘external goods’ (Macintyre 1981) such as wealth, status, adulation, power, and so on.  Yet 
even the world’s greatest athletes speak of their love for the game in and of itself. As 
indicated above, merely asserting an Olympic and amateur view of the intrinsic value of the 
holistic perfection of natural athletic talent is, however, problematic. It seems to resurrect a 
Victorian notion of the leisured gentleman athlete; a conception of sport that could be called 
anachronistic and ill-suited to the ethical task of regulating sport in an increasingly 
commercialised environment. 
 
Yes, as Aristotle observed long ago, all instrumental valuing must ultimately reduce to things 
that are of intrinsic value (Sparshott 1996). We can only go on valuing activities as means to 
ends for so long before we realize that what we pursue ultimately are things that are of value 
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in themselves such as happiness or human flourishing. What is required is not simply an 
assertion of the need to preserve what is of intrinsic value in sporting competition. Rather, 
what is needed both in anti-doping policy and practice – through the rationale for the Code 
itself - is an appropriate balance between publically shared concerns in terms of the means of 
the pursuit of victory, concern for athlete welfare, and a respect for the integrity of the 
sporting competition. Those who deny the external goods or the instrumental valuing of sport 
are naive to the reality of elite sport. Those who pursue only the external goods, who value 
only those benefits, are cynical, and uncommitted to the ethical pursuit of victory. WADAs 
ethical rationale must respect the fact that elite sports are undeniably ‘mixed goods’; a 
complex of inherent and instrumental value (Dixon, 2018; McNamee 1994, 1995).  
 
Secondly, within all previous versions of the Code, reference to ‘the spirit of sport”’ is 
conjoined with the notion of Olympism. Olympic values represent a powerful ethical 
conception of sport and includes reference to important ethical notions such as the 
preservation of human dignity, the (instrumental) use of sport for peace, and so on. In 
general, it is a vision of sport that we endorse. On the other hand, Olympism has been the 
object of considerable critical scholarship (Loland 1995, da Costa 2006, McNamee 2006, 
Parry 2006, Reid 2015). It is not a timeless essence of certain sports forms, nor is it a 
publically shared view, but rather a socially and historically conditioned ideal that finds its 
specificity in several different conceptions. The WADC, with the aim of being a global and 
harmonized anti-doping tool, seems an inappropriate instrument in which to articulate a 
singular vision of ethical sport. Moreover, although Olympism may be thought of as an ideal 
in all sports, Olympic sports are a selection of sports for the summer and winter games. And 
though their selection varies at each Olympic Games, to a minor degree, we cannot fail to 
observe that not all sports are Olympic sports, yet all sports are supposed to ascribe to the 
regulatory practices of the Code.  
 
What would an alternative formulation, constructed to a larger extent as a basis for an 
overlapping consensus, look like? As a first point, we re-state that anti-doping is a normative 
position and a choice between values. Secondly, these norms and values have to be described 
with reference to publicly shared value views and without recourse to ‘thick concepts’, noted 
above, publicly shared views can deal with the notion of protection of athletes from (certain) 
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harms and the preservation and promotion of competition integrity.13 Collecting key concepts 
and phrases from the discussion above, then, an alternative formulation could run as follows: 
 
Anti-doping is an ethical position based on a vision of the spirit of sport. Anti-doping 
programs seek both to protect the health of athletes and to provide the opportunity for 
athletes to develop and express their athletic abilities and capacities without the use of 
specified pharmacological and biomedical performance enhancing substances and 
methods. Anti-doping programs seek to maintain the integrity of sport with doping-free 
sporting competitions and environments. 
 
There is still need for further explanation. As said above, there are several forms of harm in 
sport of which some are considered acceptable and others not. Competitive sports are 
associated with certain norms and values based on which these distinctions are made. What 
are these norms and values, and how can they be expressed programmatically and as a source 
of a potential overlapping consensus?  
 
In the current Preamble, this is solved with a description of a series of values. The critique 
here is that the list of values is too loose and too general and lack operative utility. They 
certainly do not provide a definition as some scholars seem to have assumed (Foddy and 
Savulescu 2004). It might be assumed that they indicated the kinds of concepts that 
instantiated what good sport looked like: e.g, ‘excellence in performance’. In other cases, 
they seemed to play limits on the goals of participation: Health; Character and Education. 
Most substantively, they seemed to identify behavioural criteria (in ethical terms: virtues) of 
sporting conduct: Ethics, Fair play and Honesty; Dedication and Commitment; Respect for 
Rules and Laws; Respect for Self and other Participants; Courage. Even here, however, there 
appeared to be no underlying logic of their inclusion or hierarchy or coherence. The list is an 
ad hoc mixture of thin and thick concepts. It seems, at best, that the indicated values might 
inform an ethical conception of sport.  
 
                                                 
13 We do not comment here, but simply acknowledge, the obvious point that all anti-doping organization must 
be charged with responsibilities to develop and implement education and prevention programs for athletes, 
including youth, and those with medical and welfare responsibilities in support of athletes. See 
https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-code.pdf, p. 14. 
Accessed December 7, 2017. 
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In the absence of a robust rationale for their inclusion, we conclude (as others before us) that 
this disparate list should be removed from the Code. It has no utility for complex line 
drawing when considering items for the PL. Note, however, that this is not in any way to 
undermine the importance of the constitutive concepts for sports ethics generally, nor anti-
doping, specifically. It is simply to recognise that, as they presently stand, they appear 
arbitrary and disconnected from specific policy tools such as the Code or the PL. Of course, 
an alternative might be to present a comprehensively worked out ethical position on sporting 
conduct, but this seems difficult as a basis for an overlapping consensus. Nor is it required for 
such consensus. Our proposal is an approach that departs from the particular nature of sport. 
 
Although performance ideals are interpreted in many ways in various social and cultural 
settings, there are still possibilities for publicly shared views centred on the integrity of 
sporting competition. A first step could be an analysis of existing rules and regulations and an 
examination of the logic of competitive sport. Each sport is defined by its constitutive rules. 
In soccer, there is a rule against using one’s hands to control the ball (goalkeepers 
notwithstanding). In alpine skiing, there is a rule on passing through the ‘gates’ and not 
around them. A shared understanding, or what is often called an ‘ethos’, of a sport is a 
premise for meaningful participation and competition. Rules of various sports are governed 
by international federations in which technical committees make decisions on what they 
consider to be in line with the nature and ‘spirit’ of their sport, and what is not. Interestingly, 
discourses around innovation in practice and technology in sport stimulates reflection upon 
the norms and values expressed in playing or performing in them (Loland 2015).  
 
The challenge of the use of performance-enhancing substances and methods transcends 
particular sports. International agreements regarding anti-doping require a wider consensus 
among sporting communities and public authorities. Is it possible to articulate more general 
norms and values characterizing competitive sport as a whole in this respect?  
 
A closer look at sport’s rule systems demonstrates that they are designed, at least to a certain 
extent, to cultivate performances of the kind which individuals and teams can exert 
significant impact and for which they can be held responsible (Loland 2002). One example is 
attempts to compensate for inequalities in what we may call system strength. In most sports, 
there is standardization of equipment and limited access to in-competition coaching and 
medical expertise. The primary interest is in measuring athlete and team abilities and skills 
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and not the strength of support systems or quality of equipment. In addition, most sports have 
classification schemes in which biological sex, body mass and age are critical criteria. 
Women do not compete with men in sprint races, heavyweight boxers do not fight 
lightweight competitors. Again, the rationale seems to be to compensate for inequalities 
which athletes cannot really control or impact in any significant way.14 Statistically speaking, 
men have a stronger genetic predisposition to develop higher capacity for explosive power 
than their otherwise equivalent female counterparts. Boxers can be assigned responsibility for 
their fitness and technical and tactical skills, but not for their height or reach.  
 
This does not mean that sporting games are perfect expressions of fairness. Indeed, as the 
dispute over hyperandrogenism illustrates, classification issues are not always clear.15 
Moreover, examining the relationship between sporting success and system strength leads to 
relatively clear conclusions (Boscher et al 2014). Strong financial, scientific and 
technological systems breed winners. Still, the argument here is that the normative structure 
of sporting rule systems is centred around the ideal of equal opportunity to perform, and most 
ethical debates in the field (including doping) relates to fairness in one way or the other.   
 
In other words, a shared goal of sporting games, found in the set up and normative structure 
of sport, seems to be to measure, compare and rank athletes and teams according to sets of 
abilities and skills that are broadly within their sphere of impact and responsibility. In this 
way, athletes and teams can be identified with their performances, performances are in this 
sense expressions of who they are; of their background, of their efforts in developing their 
talents, of their motivation, their mental strength and resilience, et cetera. Performances can 
be seen as unique expressions of the individual and the team, that is, as authentic 
performances (Loland 2018). 
                                                 
14 In this regard, the IAAF policy against hyperadrogenism seems misplaced, perhaps even an affront to the 
dignity of the athlete who is born with condition but forced to undergo hormonal depletion (Camporesi and 
McNamee, 2018). 
15 For example, there is classification in a series of sports in which biological sex does not really matter, such as 
in shooting and sailing. On the other hand, classification according to body size could be applied outside of 
combat sports and weight lifting, for instance in sports such as basketball and volleyball in which body height is 
crucial to performance. However, this does not necessarily indicate a lack fair equality of opportunity-ideals in 
in sport, but rather a demonstration of the lack of principled application. For critical discussions of fairness in 
sport, see Loland (2002, 151 ff) and Murray (2009). Similarly, in European soccer the wealthiest clubs - Real 
Madrid, Manchester United, Barcelona, Juventus - tend to win national and international series and tournaments. 
There is a sense in the football community that the situation is unfair. Although being criticized in terms of its 
effectiveness (Peeters and Szymanski 2014), the European Soccer Federation (UEFA) has launched a so-called 
Financial Fair Play-initiative to even out gross club inequalities in wealth (Franck 2014). The equality of 
opportunity ideal exerts impact. 
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Turning again to the use of performance-enhancing pharmaceutical and biomedical 
substances and methods, this normative idea can be operationalized and serve as a critical 
criterion in line drawing issues. Enhanced performance is no longer only an expression of an 
athlete’s development of talent but, in addition, of manipulating their physiology. More often 
than not, doping is associated with assistance from medical and/or scientific expertise to 
which a degree of responsibility for the performance can be attributed.  In their defence of 
anti-doping, Malloy et al (2007) talk of protecting athletes’ ‘physiological authenticity’: 
Pharmaceutically enhanced performance is not a genuine expression of the performer, but of 
an expert system beyond. There is a parallel here in the wide-spread idea of doping as 
‘unnatural’ (Loland 2018). As it is said in anti-doping: The athlete is not ‘clean’, and 
consequently the performance in question is not ‘true’. 
 
In other words, we point to a kind of naturalised recognition of struggle against limits 
imposed both by embodied and regulative limits. We have noted above how rules limit the 
means of victory. Anti-doping rules of course are among them. This idea of natural limits can 
be operationalized in biological terms (Loland and Hoppeler 2012). Biologically speaking, 
training is utilization of the phenotypic plasticity of the human organism as developed in 
evolution. This is ‘natural’ adaptation to training and leads to performance-enhancement. 
Doping substances overruns natural adaptation and interacts directly with their biological 
targets. They can be efficient and actually life-saving in situations of illness in which natural 
adaptation fails. In sport, however, they diminish athlete and team responsibility and hence 
authenticity of performance. As argued above, these are qualities that are cultivated in the 
set-up of sporting games, and doping use corrupt the integrity of sporting competition.  
 
This interpretation of the normative structure of sporting games does not mean that we are 
removing all blurred lines and grey zones in anti-doping policy. That is an unachievable goal. 
Still, and to a larger extent than a list of values, it represents a regulative idea or norm which 
can be used operatively in ethically challenging cases. The discourse of what can be accepted 
or not accepted becomes clearer, and disagreements are easier to locate and make judgements 
upon.   
 
A much-used example is the difference between technologically constructed hypoxic 
environments (CHE) and the use of erythropoietin (EPO) (Loland and Hoppeler 2012). Both 
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have the effects of enhancing the haematocrit levels of the blood.  In CHE, athletes adapt 
systemically, and their ‘natural’ physiology is challenged. It becomes important to ‘listen to 
the body’ and adjust exposure to altitude in beneficial ways. EPO on the other hand overruns 
biological adaptation systems and enhances haematocrit levels on a short-term basis. 
Systemic adaptation is not involved which is also the case why EPO use can be dangerous 
and, in severe cases, deadly. In other words, based on the premise above, CHE is acceptable 
(although not necessarily recommendable as it can be seen as part of a problematic 
technologization of sport) whereas EPO use is not. 
 
The question now, then, is whether we propose a ‘thinner’ version of ‘the spirit of sport’ than 
the one found in the current WADA Code. One could argue that, in our elaboration of the 
logic of sport and of athletic excellence, we are approaching thick theories of sport, in this 
case with a clear liberal, Eurocentric flavour. Ideas of athlete and team responsibility of 
performance, and hence of authentic performance, constitute the core of the notion of athletes 
as role models, central to virtue-ethical accounts of sport broadly derived from Aristotle 
(Devine 2011; McNamee 2008, 2013; Murray, 2007; Reid 2015) seen broadly as the 
perfection of athletic talent towards excellence.  Nussbaum expresses this point particularly 
well: 
 
‘… the Greeks … praise outstanding athletic performance as a wonderful instance of 
human excellence. … But clearly, such activity has point and value only relatively to 
the context of the human body, which imposes certain species-specific limits and 
creates certain possibilities of movements rather than others.  To excel is to use those 





‘Human limits structure the human excellences, and give excellent action its 
significance.’(1990: 378)  
 
Even if our argument has resonance in individualist Western cultures, however, we would 
argue that this can be the case in other cultures as well such as the Chinese with a stronger 
emphasis on collective values and with a view of the athlete as a representative of the 
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systems (Brownell 2005). Our argument is an inductive one: analysing more closely the rule 
systems of sport, we have articulated what we consider to the its characteristic normative 
structure. With its global expansion, it is reasonable to assume that this structure also fits into 
other ‘comprehensive doctrines’ than those of liberal democracies. As long as an overlapping 
consensus is possible on rules on standardization (such as equipment, playing surfaces, 
timings of events and so on), classification and equality of opportunity structures, similar 
consensus should be possible on a prolongation of the normative structures in terms of anti-
doping. Moreover, our biological understanding of the elements of an athletic performance is 
‘thin’ as well and can at least be understood and critically examined within more collectivist 
visions of excellence. 
 
To summarise the formulations above, and as a Preamble justification of anti-doping 
referring to more general ideals of human excellence, we recommend a revised version of the 
Code’s ‘the spirit of sport’ account: 
 
Anti-doping is an ethical position based on a vision of the spirit of sport. Anti-doping 
programs seek both to protect the health of athletes and to provide the opportunity for 
athletes to develop and express their athletic abilities and capacities without the use of 
specified pharmacological and biomedical performance enhancing substances and 
methods. Anti-doping programs seek to maintain the integrity of sport with doping-free 
sporting competitions and environments. 
 
The purpose of anti-doping policy and practice is to preserve and promote the 
committed pursuit of athletic excellence in ways that respect the health of athletes and 
the integrity of sporting competition. 
 





We started out with problematizing WADAs justification of anti-doping as expressed in the 
WADC. We argued for recognition that anti-doping is in itself first and foremost an ethical 
position. It follows then that a principled justification of anti-doping must be normative. 
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Although the current WADC formulation of ‘the spirit of sport’ is an acknowledgement of 
this point, we have argued that the mere presence of an indicative list of values and vague 
reference to Olympism underdetermined its content while at the same time proving too 
particular to serve as a basis for common agreement. We then examined various approaches 
to normative agreement and consensus in a setting of diversity of comprehensive views. We 
argued for re-formulation of ‘the spirit of sport’ in terms of athlete protection and the 
preservation of the integrity of sporting competition that could meet requirements on an 
overlapping consensus among all WADA stakeholders. We argued that this is not just a 
matter of formality and Code acceptance. An overlapping consensus is a normative consensus 
based on fair, honest, and transparent discourse in which participants deliberate in a setting of 
mutual respect and trust, and of ‘decency’. A significant point, then, is that such a consensus 
tends to cultivate commitment and genuine support.  
 
Based on this understanding, we set out to revise the current ‘spirit of sport’ formulation and 
proposed the following alternative: 
 
Anti-doping is an ethical position based on a vision of the spirit of sport. Anti-doping 
programs seek both to protect the health of athletes and to provide the opportunity for 
athletes to develop and express their athletic abilities and capacities without the use 
of specified pharmacological and biomedical performance enhancing substances and 
methods. Anti-doping programs seek to maintain the integrity of sport with doping-
free sporting competitions and environments. 
 
The purpose of anti-doping policy and practice is to preserve and promote the 
committed pursuit of athletic excellence in ways that respect the health of athletes and 
the integrity of sporting competition. 
 
The spirit of sport is expressed in how we play true. 
 
The re-formulation we propose is programmatic as it is designed as a justificatory Preamble 
and a rationale for the current WADA Code and the basis of all other WADA policy 
instruments. We have argued that the formulation has the potential to provide a base for an 
overlapping consensus on the meaning and justification of anti-doping among all 
stakeholders. Using a few practical examples, we have argued too that it opens up fruitful and 
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principled shared deliberation, and that it has a certain operative force and can be of help in 
line-drawing between acceptable and non-acceptable means and methods. The formulation is 
proposed formally as a response to the 2021 WADA Code revision committee’s call for 
stakeholder feedback. It remains to be seen whether its alleged qualities will be tested among 








                                                 
16 We are indebted to the anonymous reviewers and to John William Devine and Javi Lopez Frias for their 




Andersen, W. and Loland, S. 2016. Jumping for recognition: Women's ski jumping viewed as 
a struggle for rights. Scandinavian Journal of Medicine and Science in Sports 27(3): 359-365. 
Benn, T., Dagkas, S., & Jawad, H. (2011). Embodied faith: Islam, religious freedom and 
educational practices in physical education. Sport, education and society, 16(1), 17-34. 
Benn, T., Pfister, G., & Jawad, H. (Eds.). (2010). Muslim women and sport. Routledge. 
Boardley, ID, Grix, J & Harkin, J (2015) Doping in team and individual sports: a qualitative 
investigation of moral disengagement and associated processes, Qualitative Research in 
Sport, Exercise and Health, 7:5, 698-717 
Brownell, S. (2005). The view from Greece: Questioning Eurocentrism in the history of the 
Olympic Games. Journal of Sport History, 32 (2): 203-216. 
Camporesi, S., & McNamee, M. (2018). Bioethics, Genetics and Sport. London: Routledge. 
Connolly, R. (2005). Balancing the justices in anti-doping law: the need to ensure fair athletic 
competition through effective anti-doping programs vs. the protection of rights of accused 
athletes. Virginia Sports & Entertainment Journal, 5: 161. 
Coalter, F. (2007). A wider social role for sport: who's keeping the score? London: 
Routledge. 
DaCosta, L. 2006. A never-ending story: The philosophical controversy over Olympism. 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 33 (2): 157-173. 
Devine, J.W. (2011) Doping is a threat to sporting excellence. British Journal of Sports 
Medicine, 45 (8): 637-639 
Møller, V & Dimeo, P (2014) Anti-doping – the end of sport, International Journal of Sport 
Policy and Politics, 6:2, 259-272 
Dimeo, P.; Møller, V. 2018. The Anti-doping Crisis in Sport: Causes, Consequences, 
Solutions. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Dixon, N. (2018) The Proper Place for External Motivations for Sport and Why They Need 
Not Subvert Its Internal Goods Sport Ethics and Philosophy,  
Foddy, B., & Savulescu, J. (2007). Ethics of performance enhancement in sport: drugs and 
gene doping. In Ashcroft,  R. E.; Dawson, A.; Draper, H.; McMillan, J. R., eds.   
Principles of Health Care Ethics. Chichester: Blackwell Wiley, 511-519. 2nd ed. 
Football Association,The (2018) The laws of the game and FA rules. 
http://www.thefa.com/football-rules-governance/lawsandrules/laws/football-11-11/law-12---
fouls-and-misconduct accessed 18.9.18. 
 25 
Franck, E. P. 2014. Financial Fair Play in European Club Football - What is it All About? 
Zurich: University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration, UZH Business 
Working Paper No. 328. 
Franklin, S., Betancurt, J. O., & Camporesi, S. (2018). What statistical data of observational 
performance can tell us and what they cannot: the case of Dutee Chand v. AFI & IAAF. 
British Journal of Sports Medicine. Published Online First: 23 February 
2018. doi: 10.1136/bjsports-2017-098513. 
Giulianotti, R., & Walsh, A. (2006). Ethics, Money and Sport: This Sporting Mammon. 
London: Routledge. 
Habermas, J. (1995). Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hampshire, S. (1989). Innocence and Experience. London: Penguin. 
Howman, D. (2015) The path to a fairer, stronger, Code. https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_pt_issue_02_14_en_final_web.pdf accessed 
4.5.2018 
Inner Ring, The (INRNG) (2010) That UCI rule on sprinting, http://inrng.com/2010/07/that-
uci-rule-on-sprinting/ accessed 19.9.18 
Karkazis, K., Jordan-Young, R., Davis, G., & Camporesi, S. (2012). Out of bounds? A 
critique of the new policies on hyperandrogenism in elite female athletes. The American 
Journal of Bioethics, 12 (7): 3-16. 
Kayser, B., Mauron, A., & Miah, A. (2007). Current anti-doping policy: a critical 
appraisal. BMC Medical Ethics, 8 (1): 2. 
Kornbeck, J. (2013). The naked spirit of sport: a framework for revisiting the system of bans 
and justifications in the world anti-doping code. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 7 (3): 313-
330. 
Kymlicka, W. (1991). Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford UK: Oxford University 
Press 
Levine, B. (2006). Should artificial high altitude environments be considered doping? 
Scandinavian Journal of Medicine and Science in Sports, 16 (5): 297–301. 
Loland, S. 1995. Coubertin's ideology of Olympism from the perspective of the history of 
ideas. Olympika 1995; 4 (1): 49-78. 
Loland, S. (2002). Fair Play in Sport. A Moral Norm System. London: Routledge.  
Loland, S., & Hoppeler, H. (2012). Justifying anti-doping: The fair opportunity principle and 
the biology of performance enhancement. European Journal of Sport Science, 12 (4): 347-
353. 
 26 
Loland, S. (2015). Performance-enhancing biomedical technology in sport: Where are the 
limits? In: Møller V., Waddington I., Hoberman J. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Sport 
and Drugs. London: Routledge 2015, 54-63. 
Loland, S., & McNamee, M. J. (2016). Anti-doping, performance enhancement, and ‘the 
spirit of sport’: a philosophical and ethical critique. In Ahmadi, N.; Ljungqvist, A., Svedsäter, 
A. (eds). Doping and public health. London: Routledge, 111-23. 
Loland, S. (2018). Performance-enhancing drugs, sport, and the ideal of natural athletic 
performance. The American Journal of Bioethics 18 (6): 8-15. 
Malloy, D. C., R. Kell and Kell, R. N. (2007). The spirit of sport, morality, and hypoxic tents: 
logic and authenticity. Applied physiology, nutrition, and metabolism 32 (2): 289-296. 
McIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of  Notre Dame 
Press.McNamee, M. (1994). Valuing leisure practices; towards a theoretical 
framework. Leisure Studies, 13(4), 288-309. 
McNamee, M. (1995). Sporting practices, institutions, and virtues: A critique and a 
restatement. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 22(1), 61-82. 
McNamee, M. (2006). Olympism, eurocentricity, and transcultural virtues. Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport, 33 (2), 174-187. 
McNamee, M. (2008). Sports, virtues and vices: Morality plays. Routledge. 
McNamee, M. J., & Tarasti, L. (2010). Juridical and ethical peculiarities in doping policy. 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 36 (3), 165-169. 
McNamee, M. J. (2012). The spirit of sport and the medicalisation of anti-doping: empirical 
and normative ethics. Asian Bioethics Review, 4 (4), 374-392. 
McNamee, M. J. (2013). Transhuman Athletes and Pathological Perfectionism: Recognising 
Limits in Sports and Human Nature. In P. Bonte, et al Athletic Enhancement, Human Nature 
and Ethics (pp. 185-198). Springer, Dordrecht. 
McNamee, M. J., (2015). The spirit of sport and anti-doping policy. In Møller V, Waddington 
I, Hoberman J (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Sport and Drugs. London: Routledge 
Meier, K, V. “Restless Sport,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 12 (1985), 64-77. 
Morgan, W. J. (1998). Multinational sport and literary practices and their communities: 
the moral salience of cultural narratives. In McNamee, M. J.; Parry, S. J. (eds) Ethics and 
sport. London: Routledge, 184-204. 
Murray, T. H. 2007. Enhancement. In Steinbock, B. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of 
Bioethics. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 491-515. 
 27 
Murray, T. H. 2009. In search for an ethics of sport: genetic hierarchies, handicappers 
general, and embodied excellence. In Performance-enhancing technologies in sports. Ethical, 
conceptual, and scientific issues, eds. Murray, T. H., K. J. Maschke, A. A. Wasunna, 225-
234. Baltimore, ML: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Murray, T. H. 2018. Good Sport. Why our Games Matter – and How Doping Undermines 
Them. NY: Oxford University Press.  
Mulhall, S., and Swift, A. (1996). Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd 
ed. 
Nussbaum, M. (1990). Love’s knowledge. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. 
Parry, J. (2006). Sport and Olympism: Universals and multiculturalism. Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport 33 (2): 188-204. 
Parry Martínková, I. (2013). Instrumentality and values in sport. Prague: Karolinum Press. 
Peeters, T., S. Szymanski. (2014). Financial fair play in European football. Economic Policy 
29 (78): 343-390. 
Rawls, J. (1987). The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 
(1): 1–25. 
Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples; with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Reedie, C. (2015). Continued commitment. https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_pt_issue_02_14_en_final_web.pdf accessed 
4.5.18 
Reid, H. L. (2015). Olympism: a philosophy of sport? In McNamee, M. J.; Morgan, W. 
J.(eds.) Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sport, 368-382. 
Ritchie, I. (2015). Understanding performance-enhancing substances and their sanctions from 
the perspective of history. In Møller, V.; Waddington, I.; Hoberman, J. (eds.) Routledge 
Handbook of Drugs and Sport. Abingdon: Routledge.  
Savulescu, J., Foddy, B. & Clayton, M. (2004). Why we should allow performance-
enhancing drugs in sport. British Journal of Sport Medicine, 38 (6): 666–670. 
Schultz, J. (2012). New standards, same refrain: the IAAF's regulations on 
hyperandrogenism. The American journal of bioethics, 12 (7), 32-33. 
Segrave, J., & Chu, D. (1981). Olympism. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. 
 28 
Soek, J. (2006). The strict liability principle and the human rights of the athlete in doping 
cases. Doctoral dissertation, Erasmus School of Law (ESL), Rotterdam. 
Sorensen, R. (2001). Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 
Sparshott, F. (1996). Taking Life Seriously: A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of Justice, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Walzer, M. (1994). Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Chicago: 
Univ. Notre Dame Press.  
White, S. K. (ed.). (1995). The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge. MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
 
 
